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5 Some Implications of Cognitive
Appraisal Theories of Emotion
PHOEBE C. ELLSWORTH
Research Center for Group Dynamics, Institute for Social Research,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48106, USA

The opposition of cognition and emotion in psychological theory has, I believe,
been one of those "killer dichotomies" (Berthoff, 1990) like nature and nurture,
or language and thought, that has advanced many a scientific career while
muddling science itself. The idea that reason and passion are alternative ways of
responding to events is an ancient and persistent one, often accompanied by the
companion ideas that reason is the more highly evolved, the more mature, the
more masculine, the more civilized, the superior alternative. Human emotion
resides somewhere beneath human cognition, somewhere under the frontal lobes,
where it is stimulated by the body, the autonomic nervous system, and the primal
honnonal soup, but not by the heavenly cerebral hemispheres, whose only relation
to the emotions is that of gentlemanly victim attacked by the riffraff, struggling
10 quell the rebellion. I have exaggerated this idea but not invented it. Like all
such dicho-tomies it makes us attend to the rather barren question "whether", in
this case whether cognition influences emotion, whether cognition is necessary for
emotion, or whether cognition is antithetical to emotion, and not to the more
interesting question " how". For the time being, I am taking the perspective that
the relation between cognition and emotion is mutual, dialectical, and marvellous.
Stated in the abstract, this statement seems commonsensical. It is implied
in the theories of famous peripheralists (eg William James 1890/ 1950; Tomkins,
1962, 1963) and in those of our grandmothers ("Look on the bright side, dear").
Stated in the abstract, it did not lead to much. Although cognition was implicit
in the theory of William James, who referred to emotion-arousing perceptions
like " being insulted by a rival" and "reading a letter announcing the death of
a loved one" , which clearly involve fairly complex cognitive processing, for
the next three-quarters of a century the cognitive aspects of emotion were rarely
singled out for theoretical attention. Cognitive components were assumed, of
course, by most researchers who relied on their commonsense and intuition to
create situations that they thought would make their subjects feel specific
emotions-Landis (1924) had his bucket of frogs, Ax (1953) his exploding
polygraph-but they received little theoretical attention. Finding a situation that
would make subjects feel fearful or angry or happy was an ad hoc methodological
issue, not a theoretical issue leading to any sort of general principles.
International Review of Studies on Emotion, Vol. I. Edited by K. T. Strongman
&1991 John Wiley & Sons Lid
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In 1962 Schachter and Singer made explicit the idea that cognition was an
essential c~mponent of emotion, and so helped bring the notion of a cognitive
component into current prominence. Their theory, however, while generating an
enormous amount of research and theory in a variety of areas (placebo effects,
pain tolerance, and self-attribution more generally), did not significantly ad\'anet
the study of emotion, except b y stimulating those who profoundly disagreed
with it. My own debut in the field of emotion (Ekman, Friesen & Ellswonh,
1972) was in part a reaction against Schachter and Singer's claim that the role
of cognition was to provide emotional color to prce.xisting undifferentiated
physiological arousal.
Although Schachter and Singer revitalized the idea that in order to understand
the person's emotion it was necessary to understand the per on's cogni1il·e
interpretation of the situation, they had little to say about the kinds of cognition
that were important in differentiating among the emotions. Methodologically,
like their predecessors , they relied on the face validity of ad hoc situational
manipulations, while conceptually they referred generally to social comparison
theory (Festinger, 1954), without s pecifying exactly hov.. i1 applied to the domain
of emotion.
In the early 198Os a number of researchers , working independemly, began
to develop models designed to go beyond the general statement that cognition
is an important component of emotion, models that would specify the kinds of
cognitive interpretations that lead to different emotions. The basic premise is
that emotions result from the way people interpret or appraise their environment.
Different patterns of appraisals res ult in different emotions. The reason sorrow
is different from anger is that people who are sad see their situation (and
themselves in relation to that situation) differently from people who arc aogry.
The term "appraisal" . I believe, was first used in this context by Magda
Arnold (1945, 1960), who argued that as organisms move through their physical
or mental environments they are ceaselessly engaged in evaluating the signilicanct
of environmental changes for their own well-being. These appraisals result in
Action Tendencies, which are felt as emotions. Although this general perspcdl1e
started no immediate movement in the field, it was kept alive by Richard Lazarll.i
(eg Lazarus, 1968). For Lazarus, the subjective experience of emotion includes lhc
appraisal, the associated physiological feedback and the motivation 10 relevanl
action. Unlike Arnold, Lazarus reasoned tha; since human beings ha\e 1be
capacity for immense variability in their appraisals of situations, human emotions
should also be immensely various; the idea that the world of emotions is made
up of a few large distinct categories (such as joy, sorrow, and fear) is misleadinl
(Lazarus, Kanner & Folkman, 1980; see also Frijda, 1986, chapter 4).
Over the past decade, interest in this general perspective has spread wid~I),
a nd there are now more than half a dozen appraisal models of emo1ion beaflll!
a close family resemblence to each other (for example Frijda, 1986; Roseman,
1984; Scherer• 1984; Wiener, 1985). Each of these models differs in some 11 a)'S
from all th e others, but there is also considerable overlap. There is general
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agreement that the emotions, including the "basic" emotions identified by
categorical theorists, can be broken down into smaller components, and that
many of these components correspond to cognitive appraisals (Ortony & Turner,
1990). The purpose of this chapter is to discuss some implications of this general
point of view for a few issues that have been of perennial concern to students
of emotion, and to suggest a few new hypotheses generated by an appraisal
point of view. That is, rather than nitpicking about the relative virtues and vices
of the varous members of this family of models, I want to talk about what the
family as a whole has to offer. (I hasten to add that I have no idea whether
the authors of the other models would agree with the ideas presented here.)
THE SMITH AND ELLSWORTH MODEL
In our first study (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), Smith and I proposed eight
dimensions of appraisal that differentiate emotional experience: attention,
pleasantness, certainty, perceived obstacle, anticipated effort , responsibility,
control and legitimacy. We asked people to remember and try to reexperience
a specific situation in which they had experienced each of 15 different emotions,
to describe the situation, and to rate their perceptions of the situation on scales
designed to tap the eight appraisal dimensions. We found six orthogonal
dimensions that reliably differentiated among the emotions. Four of these
corresponded to our proposed appraisals of attention, pleasantness, certainty,
and anticipated effort. The other two were combinations of our proposed
responsibility and control dimensions. The first, human agency, reflected the
perception that the event was caused by oneself (at one pole of the dimension)
or by some other person (at the opposite pole). The second, situational control,
reflected the perception that the event was caused by a human being (any human
being or beings, oneself or someone else) or by impersonal circumstances beyond
human control.
Thus for example, although fear, anger, and sadness were all unpleasant,
fear was associated with moderately high anticipated effort and very high
uncertainty; anger was associated with moderately high effort and certainty,
and with a very strong perception that some other human being was responsible
for the adversity; and sadness was associated with lower attention, lower
perceived effort, and a very strong perception that the adversity was brought
about by circumstances beyond anyone's control. Thirteen of the 15 emotions
we studied were characterized by a unique constellation of appraisals (shame
and guilt did not differ, nor did anger and contempt). Thus we have gone beyond
previous work on dimensions of emotion, which has been dominated by studies
of differences along simple pleasantness and activation dimensions, and have
put some specific content into the cognitions associated with various emotions.
Whether these are the "right" dimensions or the only dimensions of appraisal
is an open question, but it is not a question to be addressed in this chapter.
I would be astonished if any one of the appraisal researchers had managed to
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get the details right in less than a deca~e of work,_ but I do not t~k the details
should be our only concern. Leaving aside the paruculars of the vanous appraisal
theories, I want to examine the implications and the heuristic value of the general
perspective.
BASIC EMOTIONS, UNIVERSAL EMOTIONS
Theories of emotion can be categorized in terms of the number of emotions 1he,
postulate: two, a few, quite a few, or an infinite number. Two-emotion theories
are valence theories: the organism feels good and approaches, or feels bad and
withdraws (Young, 1943; Zajonc, 1980). By adding an intensity or activation
dimension, orthogonal to the valence dimension, many theorists have expanded
the basic positive-negative dichotomy into a two-dimensional space into which
many, possibly an infinite number of emotions can be fitted (Woodworth &
Schlosberg, 1954; Russell, 1980). These models have been criticized on several
grounds. In particular, the major negative emotions common to almost all
categorical theories of emotion-grief, fear, and anger-are all intense, unpleasant
states, and thus fall very close to each other in the two-dimensional space.
Phenomenologically, something important seems to be missing from a scheme
that characterizes fear as a more activated version of grief, or grief as a more
unpleasant version of anger (Frijda, 1986, chapter 4).
Those who posit a few emotions (Tomkins, 1962, 1963; Ekman, 1984; lzard,
1977, among others) reject the notion that differences in activation and valence,
or even differences along three dimensions (Wundt, 1907; Schlosberg, 1954;
Osgood, 1966), can adequately capture the fundamental qualitative differences
in the subjective experience of various emotions. Instead, they postulate a small
number of innate, categorically distinct, hardwired neural programs corresponding
to certain "basic" emotions: fear, sorrow, happiness and anger are included
on the lists of almost all these categorical theorist ; after that the lists diverge.
Each of the basic emotions has distinct neurophysiological, expressive, and
subjective characteristics.
There are two major problems that proponents of this categorical viewpoint have to face: the problem of subjective emotional experiences that do
not fit into any of the basic categories (eg pride, frustration, jealousy, pity)
and the problem of transitions between emotions. One common way of dealing
with the first problem is simply to deny that these other affective s1a1es
are emotions (Ekman, 1984). This tactic raises the awkward question, "What
are they then, and what is their relationship to the states we have decided to
define as. true emotions?" Another common way of dealing with the first
problem 1s to speak rather metaphorically of "blends". Thus, for examplt.
Plutchik (1984) considers remorse to be a blend of the basic emotions of disgust
and sadness,. love to be a blend of joy and acceptance. While various versions
of the blend idea may be more or less satisfactory on a metaphorical Je,el, the)'
all beg the question of what is actually happening. Are both neural programs fuin~
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simultaneously at partial strength? A similar problem arises with transitions
between emotions, particularly gradual transitions. Consider the common
transition from distress to anger. You come home late through the freezing rain
and discover that you are locked out-the house key is not in its usual hidingplace. As you rack your brains about what to do and where the key might be and
slowly come to the realization that your husband must have used it without
remembering to put it back where it belongs, your initial distress changes to
anger. Does the distress program switch off and the anger program on? Or does
the distress program slowly wane while the anger program slowly waxes? In
either case, why do these changes occur?
According to an appraisal point of view, a new appraisal has been addedyou realize that someone else is responsible for your misery, and the emotion
changes correspondingly from distress to anger. A dimensional, appraisal point
of view is compatible with an infinite number of emotional states (Lazarus, Kanner
& Folkman, 1980; Mandler, 1975). As a person's appraisal of the situation
changes, so will his or her emotion, gradually or suddenly depending on the
speed of the appraisal change.
One hypothesis raised by this point of view is that transitions between some
emotions should be easier (more likely, faster) than transitions between other
emotions, depending on the number of appraisals they have in common. In our
theory, hope and fear are both characterized by high levels of uncertainty, high
attention, and the perception of an obstacle, differing only on the dimension of
pleasantness; therefore the transition from hope to fear should be an especially
easy one. Someone waiting for news that may or may not be good provides a
classic example of the vacillation between hope and fear as attention is focused
first on the possible success, then on the possible failure. Fear and sadness are
further apart in dimensional space (at least in our model), hope and sadness
further still. Transitions between these states should be correspondingly more
difficult.
A primary argument in favo r of a Umited number of primary emotions, raised
by Darwin in 1872 and revived a hundred years later by Tomkins (1962), Izard
(1971), and Ekman, (1972, 1984), is that there are distinctive, culturally universal
facial expressions corresponding to some emotions but not others. These emotions,
then, must be innate and somehow more basic than the others.
Cognitive appraisal theories propose that emotions are the resultants of a set
of appraisals; what we feel is some sort of combination of appraisals. What does
this suggest about emotional facial expressions? It suggests the hypothesis that the
so-called basic facial expressions may also be composed of more primitive, but
still meaningful elements-elements corresponding to the appraisals of pleasantness, certainty, and so on (Ortony &Turner, 1990). An examination of the prototypical examples of the facial expressions corresponding to the basic emotions
proposed by Tomkins (1962, 1963), Izard (1977), and Ekman and Friesan (1975)
reveals that the expressions of different emotions have elements in common. The
eyebrows and lids are raised in both fear and surprise, the brows are drawn
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together in both anger and disgust. Also, just as the same elements may appear
in different emotions, so the "same" emotion may be expressed with somewhat
different combinations of elements. Although all the published prototypical
expressions of sadness are recognizably sad and the expressions of anger
recognizably angry, they are not identical . Anger, for example, may be expressed
with an open mouth that bares the teeth or with tightly compressed lips.
An appraisal point of view implies that angry faces resemble each other
because the experience of anger is the product of a particular set of appraisals
and it is these appraisals that are reflected on the face. Typically the angry person
perceives an obstacle-this perception of an obstacle may be reflected in a frown.
A frown will also occur, however, when people who are not angry perceive an
obstacle-people who are fearful, for example, or simply puzzled. Likewise we
may hypothesize that an angry person who is exercising a high level of control
will have compressed lips, but an angry person who is less in control will have
an open mouth.
In our initial research (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), each time we asked our
subjects to remember a particular emotion we also asked them to show us the
corresponding facial expression. We found that a number of specific facial
movements were significantly correlated with specific situational appraisals.
While these results were encouraging, they were by no means conclusive. The
expressions were posed, and the data were correlationaJ.
In a follow-up study, Smith ( 1989) tested the hypothesis that the appraisal of
an obstacle results in a frown-the eyebrows drawn together through the action
of the corrugator muscle. Previous research and theory had generally designated
the frown as a sign of negative affect; if, however, it also reflects the perception
of an obstacle, it should show up in certain positive states as well, such as interest
or challenge. Smith used a directed imagery task in which subjects were asked to
imagine themselves in various pleasant situations. The appraisals of perceived
obstacle and agency (self or other) were systematically varied across the situations.
Challenging a friend to a race was an example of a high obstacle situation; relaxing
in the sun after finishing an assignment a low obstacle situation. The frown, along
with various other facial muscle movements, was measured by EMG. As expected,
the eyebrows were drawn together significantly more when the subjects imagined
situations involving an obstacle than when they imagined situations requiring
no effort, even though all the imagined situations were pleasant ones.
This study provides the first experimental evidence for the hypothesis that facial
movements that are components of emotional facial expressions reflect appraisals
that are components of emotional experience. Other physical responses may also
reflect appraisal components. Indeed, in the same study Smith found that heart
rate differed significantly for high effort and low effort scenarios, and Scherer
(1986) has presented evidence linking speech parameters to appraisals.
Obviously this research represents a very preliminary first step, and raises
more questions than it answers. Students of emotion have generally assumed
that certain combinations of facial elements tend to co-occur-that typically
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the facial expression of an emotion will show the common prototypical combinatfon of elements rather than a partial or mixed pattern. The first question is, is
this true? We may have assumed that these prototypical patterns are the most
common ones because they are the ones we have studied. Early researchers, using
less carefully selected photographs, found less evidence for basic recognizable
emotions (cf Munn, 1940). Subjects in our experiments, unless we explicitly direct
them to focus on instances when they felt a single, "pure" emotion, rarely do so.
Usually they report feeling more than one emotion (Smith & Ellsworth, 1987;
Ellsworth & Smith 1988a,b). Perhaps complete unblended facial expressions of
emotion are relatively rare. The second question is, if it is true that certain facial
elements tend to co-occur, why do they? Is it because they are biologically wired
to co-occur, or because the appraisals tend to co-occur? (See Ortony & Turner,
1990 for an excellent discussion of why appraisals might tend to co-occur.)

Cultural pattern
A second line of questions goes as follows. If the appraisals correspond to facial
movements, could the appraisals be universal components of emotion? Cultures
may differ in the sorts of things that command attention; arouse basic positive or
negative feelings, are believed to be caused by self, other, or no one; or are seen
as obstacles. But if appraisals a re universal components of emotion, we would
predict that people in different cultures will feel angry when they believe that
someone else has caused them trouble, though their beliefs about the kinds of
trouble that are caused by other people, and even their definition of trouble, may
vary. There is now some evidence for cross-cultural generality of some of the basic
appraisals (Scherer, W allbott & Summerfield, 1986; Mauro, Sato & Tucker, 1990).
Appraisal theories also suggest interesting hypotheses for exploring cultural
diversity in emotions, not just cultural similarity. Suppose, for example, cultural
world views differ in ideas about the forces that control human endeavor. Some
cultures, such as our own, might emphasize human agency and individual
enterprise, while others assign greater power to destiny or to supernatural powers
less easily controlled by human efforts. Might we then predict differences in
the socialization, the frequency, and even the experience, of anger and sorrow?

Individual patterns
Of course, cultures are not the only source of variation in the way human beings
understand their environments. A perennial issue in research on emotions has been
the range of individual variability within a single culture (typically our own).
When faced with the same situation, different people often respond with different
emotions. An obvious implication of the cognitive appraisal viewpoint is that
people respond with different emotions because they appraise the situation
differently. This general statement, of course, may be painfully self-evident, but
appraisal theories go beyond the general statement to specify the differences
in interpretation that produce the differences in emotions. An event may be seen

150

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF STUDIES ON EMOTION

as an obstacle by one person but not by another. Or people may differ in the
amount of control they feel they have over events (cf Peterson & Seligman, 1987).
If people habitually tend to favor some appraisals over others, differing in their
"appraisal styles", we would predict that they would respond more readily and
more frequently with the corresponding emotions. A person who characteristically
sees her misfortunes as caused by bad luck or uncontrollable circumstances may
be prone to depression, while one who characteristically attributes misfonune
to other people's malice may be prone to aggression (cf Roseman, 1984; Wiener,
1985). Other individual differences may also affect a person's appraisals.
Differences in self-concept are one major source of emotional differences. A
person who is confident of her social skills will experience le s uncertaimy, and
thus less fear, when faced with a large crowd of merrymakers than a person
who is less confident. Differences in socialization can affect our taste in food,
amusements, and other people, and thus our initial appraisal of a ne\\- exemplar
as positive or negative.

EFFECTS OF EMOTION UPON COGNITION
Most of the work on cognitive appraisals and emotion has so far been concerned
with the hypothesis that a given pattern of appraisals results in a panicular,
predictable emotion. This has been the working assumption; in fact, most of
the work to date has been aimed at establishing the correlations between
appraisal patterns and emotions in describing the domain of emotional
experience. Nonetheless, the hypothetical sequence that has formed the basic
working assumption of these endeavors is that appraisals cause the emotions.
Studies using imagery (eg Smith, 1989) and vignettes have begun to examine
the question of causality more directly, but there is still a great deal 10 be done
along these lines.
Little attention has been devoted to exploring another possible causal sequence:
the possibility that emotions influence future appraisals. Other researchers not
associated with the cognitive appraisal perspective have studied the effects of
emotion on cognition. Forgas and Bower (1987) review a number of studies
showing that a generally positive or negative mood affects estimates of personal
efficacy, judgments of political circumstances, and evaluations of one's 0110
behavior in a social situation (see also lsen, 1984). Johnson and Tversky (1983)
found that a negative mood brought on by reading newspaper reports of tragic
events substantially increased people's estimates of the likelihood of other,
unrelated catastrophes, while a positive mood decreased their likelihood estimares.
This effect operated at a very general affective level: the surface similarity
between the events in a newspaper story and the specific future risk evaluated
did not affect subjects' estimates of the likelihood of the future risk. Reading
about someone who was killed in a fire increased estimates of the likelihood
of dying from cancer as much as it did estimates of dying from a fire or flood.
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work in this tradition has been limited both in the choice of emotional
antecedents and in the choice of cognitive consequences. On the antecedent side,
the "emotions" investigated are typically points on a simple positive-negative
dimension; the experimenter compares a good, pleasant mood with a bad,
unpleasant mood, occasionally adding a no-treatment control group to represent
some intermediate point on the same dimension. On the consequence side, most
of the influences that mood has been shown to exert on judgment can be
..:haracterized as simple optimism and pessimism.
A fundamental principle of appraisal theories is that different negative
emotions (and, for that matter, different positive emotions) are quite dissimilar
in their patterns of appraisal, suggesting that fear, sadness, and anger should
affect future judgments in different ways. An emotion may affect people's
judgments of new situations in ways that correspond to the appraisals that are
most diagnostic of that emotion. For example, since the perception of agency
has repeatedly been found to be important in differentiating among negative
affective states (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a; Roseman, 1984), one might predict
that different negative emotions will result in different perceptions of the causes
of subsequent events. Angry people should be prone to see other people as
responsible, sad people to see the same events as caused by uncontrollable
situational forces, guilty people to see themselves as responsible.
Some preliminary data (Keltner & ELisworth, 1990) indicate that emotions
can affect judgments in more specific ways than global optimism or pessimism,
and in ways that are directly predictable from the appraisal model. In one study,
we induced subjects to feel sad or angry by having them read detailed stories
of a tragic or infuriating event. Then, following Johnson and Tversky (1983),
we asked subjects to estimate the likelihood of various life events, some positive
and some negative. Half of these events were described as the result of human
agency (" Because of a dishonest salesman a new car you buy turns out to be
a lemon"; "You meet your loved one through a friend"), while the other half
were described in relatively impersonal terms ("Because of a factory problem
a new car you buy turns out to be a lemon"; "You meet your loved one in
a random encounter"). As predicted, compared to sad subjects, angry subjects
rated events caused by other people as more likely and events caused by
impersonal circumstances as less likely. It is especially striking that although
all subjects were in a negative mood, the bias in estimates of agency affected
Perceptions of the likelihood of both positive and negative events.
In a second study, we predicted that when angry and sad people are confronted
With a new situation that is ambiguous, aUowing for several possible interpretations, the angry subjects would focus on the actions and intentions of other
~eople and the sad subjects on situational causes. Anger and sadness were
1nduced as in the previous study, we then gave the subjects a fairly long,
complicated story and asked them to imagine themselves as the protagonist.
In the story, the protagonist meets a wonderful new man (or woman if the subject
Was male), gushes about him to her room-mates, and invites him to a party.

152

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF STUDIES O EMOTION

When he finally arrives, he brings a date, the room-mates laugh, the man and
his date seem upset, everyone keeps glancing at the embarrassed hostess, and
all in all it is a social mess. Responsibility for this mess could be assigned to
other people (eg the room-mates, the new m an), to no one, or to oneself as
protagonist. As expected, angry subjects were more likely than sad subjects to
blame others and less likely to attribute the imbroglio to circumstances beyond
anyone's control. (We attempted to run a guilt condition as weU, but this failed.)
These results are quite preliminary, and do not yet provide unequivocal
evidence for the effects of emotion on future cognitive appraisals. For one thing,
the study needs to be replicated using an emotional induction lhat is less cognitive
in order to avoid the problem that appraisals prime apprai als, with no causal
role for the emotion.
Nonetheless, t he results are encouraging. The idea that emotion exens powerful effects o n cognition is an ancient one, providing a central theme in literature
ranging from great tragedies to innumerable elf-help books. Scientifically the idea
is also old, but it has remained fairly primitive. Most theory and research has
argued either that emotions influence cognition by di rupting it (eg Claparede,
1928; Mandler, 1975) or that pleasant emotions lead to pleasant thoughts and
unpleasant emotions lead to unpleasant thoughts. Both of these hypothestSart
undoubtedly correct, at least some of the time, but even taken together tbeyseem
a bit thin fo r a century of research . Cognitive appraisal theories suggest new
directions to follow in exploring the effects of emotions on cognition. Wehm
begun to explore the agency dimension, but others-attention, percei\'ed obstacle,
certainty-may prove heuristic in generating new hypotheses as well.
THE SEQUENCING OF EMOTIONAL EXPERIE CE
Episodic sequencing
The commonsense, lay view of emotions, at lea t in this culture, is that they
are immediate, holistic, subjective responses to arousing stimuli. When thwarted,
we feel anger; when threatened, we feel fear. One of the earliest (and some would
argue most pernicious) scientific theories of emotions explicitly took issue\\ith
this commonsense theory of sequencing. William James (1884, 1890) proposed
that the exciting stimulus produced a specific pattern of autonomic arousal and
muscular activity that either caused or defined the subjective experience of
emotion. While the question "Which comes first the feeling or lhe 'expression·1••
has oc~upied researchers off and on for a cemu'ry (James, 1884; Cannon, 19?7:
Tomkms, 1962; Laird, 1974; Tourangeau & Ellsworth, 1979; Winton, t9S6l,
most of the_discussions of this question have explicitly or implicitly assumed
tha~ the bodily response corresponding to a specific emotion has no time sequcnct
~fits own, no r does the subjective experience. The major disputes about the
time course of an emotional episode have centred around the order ofthcttntral
and peripheral components.
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Appraisal theories put forward a different set of questions about an emotional
episode. They suggest that full-blown emotions are not unitary, that not all of the
components of the subjective experience, or of the peripheral response, emerge
simultaneously. Some appraisals may be more immediate than others, suggesting
that any given emotional experience may be broken down into a microsequence
of events both centrally and peripherally. The existence of the general term
"emotion" and the assumption that certain basic states such as fear, anger,
joy, and sadness were prototypical examples of this general category may have
led us unwittingly to assume more unitary experiences within each category and
more similarity in the time sequence across categories than is justified. If
appraisals are made sequentially, there may be much more variability in the
states typically labelled "emotions" than previous researchers have considered.
Klaus Scherer (eg Scherer, 1984) has described some of the implications of
the assumption that appraisals occur sequentially, and my own thinking follows
very similar lines. According to this view, a possible sequence in the development
of an emotion might be as follows.
First, something attracts the person's attention. This event is similar to
Mandler's (1975) notion of an interruption. The arousal of attention is the first
step in entering the emotional system; if nothing attracts or changes the focus
of the person's attention, no emotion will be felt, or if the person was already
experiencing an emotion, no new emotion will be felt. Scherer (1984) refers to
arousal of attention as an evaluation of novelty. At this point the person may
identify the arousing stimulus as uninteresting or inconsequential (the sudden
noise was the dishwasher moving into a new cycle, the scream was part of a
TV show) and no further progression towards a full-fledged emotional experience
will occur . This is roughly the sort of process that Schachter and Singer (1962)
posited for the subjects in their "informed" conditions; their attention was
aroused in part by their own physiological arousal, but because they believed
it was merely a side-effect of the drug they had taken, no emotion followed.
Before discounting or further appraising the eliciting stimulus, the person
may experience startle or surprise. This view of surprise is common across many
theories, not just appraisal theories (cf Tomkins, 1962, 1984). There is considerable
controversy over whether surprise should be considered an emotion or not. It
has a clear facial expression (Tomkins, 1962), which is recognizable crossculturally, although not as readily as some other emotional expressions (Ekman,
Sorenson & Friesen, 1969; Izard, 1971), but some theorists feel that not enough
has happened for surprise to be considered an emotion: it is too reflex-like and
primitive (Lazarus, 1982). It does not even have a valence, like other emotions
(Ortony & Turner, 1990). It cannot last long without disappearing or turning
into some other emotion. Appraisal theorists (and dimensional theorists in
general) are less interested than other theorists in deciding which states are
"really" emotions and which ones are not. In their view, surprise fits naturally
into the sequence of emotional events at a very early stage (Scherer, 1984), and
involves only one appraisal. The decision about whether surprise does or does
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not have enough in common with other emotions to deserve the label "emouon"
is an arbitrary one.
Given that attention has been aroused, the next step in the sequence is a global
response of positive or negative affect, a sense of pleasantness or unpleasantness.
T his may often occur simultaneously with the arousaJ of attention, as argued
so persuasively by Zajonc (I 980). In the case of basic sensory experiencessmells or tastes or walking out into a balmy spring day-the positive or nega1i1e
response is probably immediate. CertainJy there is strong evidence that a prirnitnt
positive or negative affective response can occur very early, even before other
significant aspects of the stimulus (eg gender) can be identified (Murphy, 1990).
In other cases, as when we meet a new person, it may be immediate, but it mai
not. We may instead feel uncertain, or vacillate between po itive and negative
views, or even feel fairly neutral. More complex stimuli may introduce a sense
of "feeling emotional" before a clear-cut emotion emerges. For example, the
news that East and West Germany were to be reunited may have elicited an
immediate positive or negative response in some people, but other people may
have responded, even immediately, with ambivalence or with undifferentiated
excitement, sensing that this was emotionally relevant news but not immediately
clear whether it was positive or negative.
If an immediate positive response occurs (and if we could stop the sequence
then, or if there were no further developments), the person might say that she
is feeling "good" or "happy". In general, the positive emotions seem to be
less well differentiated than negative emotions (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988b), perhaps
because the label happy can be applied to this fairly simple, immediate state.
If the initial appraisal is negative, more is generally needed before the person
can give the emotion o ne of the common emotion labels. The person may say
she feels "unhappy" or "bad", meaning that she does not feel happy, but more
is needed before she can say she feels angry, or sad, or frightened.
Zajonc (1980), as well as some appraisal theorists (eg Scherer, 1984), bas
argued that a definite pleasantness-unpleasantness response occurs at this early
stage. Undoubtedly it often does, but I am arguing that thls is not necessarily
the case. The sequence of appraisals, once attention has been aroused, may be
somewhat variable. Sometimes a sense of strong uncertainty may occur before
a person feels positive or negative. Seeing a stranger walking up the driveway
towards one's door may arouse strong curiosity (interest), which may tum to
fear if a closer approach reveaJs an expression of hostility on the person; or
pleasure, if it turns out not to be a stranger but a close friend; or anger, if a
clipboard reveals that it is yet another door-to-door salesman.
T hese brief examples involve appraisals along other dimensions-appraisals of
uncertainty, obstacle, and agency. The order in which the various appraisals take
place may be quite variable depending on properties of the eliciting circumstances
themselves and of the current state of mind (eg current goals) of the perceiver.
There are several implications of this point of view. One is that a substantial
proportio n of o ur emotional lives may be spent in emotional states that do not
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correspond to any of the prototypical "basic" emotions because we have not
yet made all of the appraisals necessary to reach such a state (cf Stein & Levine,
1990). Being in one of these states may make some emotions more probable
than others, in that some of the requisite appraisals have been made. Likewise,
emotional responses to major life events with many implications are notoriously
nuid (Parkes, 1972); the immediate emotion changes as the perceiver focuses
on different aspects of the situation.
A second implication is that emotions may vary substantially in terms of their
latencies. At least since Cannon's (1927) critique of the James-Lange theory
of emotions, in which one of Cannon's arguments was that the autonomic
nervous system responds too slowly to account for the immediate subjective
experience of emotion, we have tended to assume that immediacy is a general
characteristic of emotion, perhaps even criteria! (cf Ekman, 1984). This
assumption has distracted us, as researchers, from the possibility of slower
sequences, or different sequences. Perhaps one of the reasons that the emotion
of love has been ignored by many theorists is that it typically lacks the sudden
onset implied by the commonly accepted view of emotion. Categorical theories
which are based on the firing of discrete emotional programs make little allowance
for differential latencies. Tomkins' theory allows differential latencies between
emotions but does not easily accommodate the single emotion of anger developing
quickly or gradually. One way to avoid this issue, of course, is to say that it is not
anger (or fear, or sorrow) until the moment when the last step is taken and the
program fires, or the last appraisal is definite. This may be a tidy answer but the
question "What was it before that?" lingers in the air. A definitional answer
simply distracts attention from a host of unanswered questions about sequence.
I have no doubt that many emotional experiences may be immediate and
complete: in appraisal terms, all the appraisals are made in extremely rapid
sequence and the subjective experience is much the same as we would expect
if the underlying process were the firing of a complete program. But I also have
no doubt that some emotional experiences follow other sequences. They may
be slower. They may never get to an end state corresponding to one of the
commonly recognized basic emotions. The person may remain uncertain about
a key appraisal (eg What is responsible for my misfortune?) and so may remain
indefinitely ambivalent. I believe it would be very useful for an understanding
of emotion to turn our attention to emotional sequences that do not fit the
standard theories. There are obvious cases where everything seems out of order.
People who just barely avoid an automobile accident, for example, often report
that the behavior (swerving to avoid the oncoming car) precedes both the
appraisal and the emotion. People often seem to feel no affect at all for a brief
period after hearing about some catastrophe. Eventually a theory of emotion
must account for the exceptional cases as well as the rule, if it is the rule (cf
Stein & Levine, 1990).
The view that appraisals, rather than whole emotions, are the basic units of
affective processing not only suggests new questions about the sequencing of
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emotional experience, but also provides a new perspective on 1he traditional
questions of sequence. From J ames ( I 884) to the Zajonc-Lazarus controversy
(Zajonc, 1980, 1984; Lazarus, 1982), questions about the episodic sequeoetof
emotional experience have provoked some of the most heated debates in the
field. The three most commonly proposed sequences are:
I. The commonsense theory:
Stimulus-+interpretation-affect-behavior
The commonsense theory could also be called the cognitive science theory
(Ortony, Clore & Collins, 1988) and has been implied, if n01 explicitly stated,
in most of the cognitive appraisal theories (Frijda, 1986; Roseman, 1984;
Scherer, 1984; Wiener, 1985, Stein & Levine, 1989; Smith & Ellsworth, 19&5).
A person perceives (or evaluates or apprai c or interprets) a stimulus and
a subjective emotional experie nce results, followed by behavior.
2. The affective primacy theory:
Stimulus-+affect-+interpretation-+behavior
This view was proposed by Wundt (1907) and revived in 1980 by Zajonc.
In Zajonc's words, " it is entirely possible tha1 the very first stage of the
organism's reaction to stimuli and the very first elements in retrieval are
affective. It is further possible that we can like something or be afraid of
it before we know precisely what it is and perhaps even without knowing
what it is" (Zajonc, 1980, p. 154; see also Murphy, 1990). The imerpre1atioo
(sometimes, in this view, a justification) follows.
3. Motor feedback theories:
Sti m ul us-+behavior-+a ffect-+interpretation
Here the visceral and motor response "follow directly the perception of 1he
exciting fact'' (James, 1890/ 1950, p. 449) and the awareness of the bodily
changes is the emotion. The example of the near accident is a classic Jamesiao
sequence. Recent facial feedback theories (Tomkins, 1962; Izard, 1971; Laird,
1974) a lso assume this kind of sequence.
Most of the proponents of these three sequences have put forward theori~
that are far more complex, and often qualified, than these simple schematic
representations. Most of them have focused primarily on the first rwo stages
~fter the eliciting event-interpretation preceding affect, affect preceding
mterpretation, or behavior preceding affect-and have been less clear about
the last link (the role of behavior in the first two theories the role of intepretation
in the last). Also, considerable complexity is introduced ~vhen various definitions
of " b:havior"_ are considered-autonomic behavior, expressive (usually facial)
behavior, or "instrumental" responses such as running away or striking a blow.
I have obviously oversimplified all three points of view.
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onetheless, many of the authors of these theories have themselves presented
their ideas in strong, simple, provocative terms, introducing the complexities
and qualifications only later, and this, I think, has led many readers, including
many psychological researchers, to assume that interpretation, subjective
experience, and possibly behavior are themselves somehow units. Thus the
common view of the first theory is that all the interpretation must take place
before any affect is felt, while in the second theory a complete emotional
experience pops into existence before any interpretation takes place.
Appraisal theories, by breaking down the interpretation stage of the process
into components, suggest that the stages implied by these theories are far too
global. There is no reason to believe that a subjective sense of emotion must
be delayed until all the appraisals have been made. Rather, the emotional
experience develops over time in a rapid sequence of appraisals, bodily responses,
and subjective changes. We have seen that individual appraisals can produce
changes in facial expression (Smith, 1989) and we propose that they can produce
changes in autonomic processes and affective experience as well. At the moment
when the organism's attention is aroused, bodily changes take place (orienting
response) and the organism feels different from the way it did before the event.
When the organism senses that the stimulus is pleasant or unpleasant, the
experience and the bodily responses change again. As each appraisal is made,
the body and the affective experience change. The sequence may be so rapid
as to be perceived as instantaneous or it may be considerably more drawn out.
When all appraisals are clear, it may result in a "pure" emotion corresponding
to one of the basic emotions proposed by the categorical theorists. When one
or more appraisals are ambiguous, the person may say that she does not know
what she is feeling, but would have no doubt that she is feeling "emotional".
When one or more appraisals is variable, the person may vacillate among
emotions. And, of course, the event itself may develop over time, so that initial
appraisals are replaced by new ones.
In effect, this point of view allows the person to feel affect very early in the
sequence, certainly as early as the initial assessment (or experience) of valence,
possibly earlier. It also allows for some emotional states, such as guilt or anger,
to depend on considerably more cognitive processing. Many of the debates among
proponents of the time sequences outlined above are in fact debates about when
in the sequence we are willing to say the person crosses the threshold into what we
want to call an emotion. If emotions develop over time (even if very rapidly), then
the answer to this question becomes somewhat arbitrary depending on the theorist's
definition of emotion. In our view, feelings come first, and they also come last.
Ootogenetic sequencing

A further implication of appraisal theories is that if an organism lacks the cognitive
capacity to make a particular appraisal, it will not feel emotions that depend on
that appraisal. A newborn can feel a generalized distress (positive-negative
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appraisal), but cannot feel anger or sadness, which depend upon more sophisticated appraisals of agency. Scherer ( 1984) has propo ed an ontogenetic sequen-t
of the emergence of some of the basic emotions, based on his appraisal theory,
and Stein and her colleagues (Stein & Levine, 1989, 1990) ha,e done considerabk
work on appraisal- emotion relationships in older children. Further de,elopmm
work would be enormously useful for exploring hypotheses about whether~
capacity for various appraisals is necessary for the e~perience of various emotions.

C O NCLUDING REMARKS

Basically, this chapter has been a highly self-indulgent account of" by I findm)
own theory, and others like it , so interesting. It has allowed me to discuss ideas and
implications that I have barely begun to study empiricall), and :,Orne that Iba1c
not studied at all, in the hope that they will be taken up and incorporated into
other people's research, to be developed, revised, or refuted. I have not dealt \\ith
certain fundamental problems that emotions theorists must face, most notably~
questions of unconscious emotions, vicarious emotions, and unconscioll.l
appraisals leading to conscious emotions. I have not claimed that emouon ~
impossible without appraisal. I have not even tried in this chapter 10 argue that the
appraisal theories of emotion are true, but to argue that they are heuristic. They
suggest lines of investigation that are not suggested by other theories, and they
suggest that certain commonly held assumptions about emotions may need to be
examined more closely. Because I wanted to put forward a wide range of
implications, my treatment of each one of them has inevitably been superficial.
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